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Date: April 29, 2024 Mon
Time: 8:36 pm
Time: 8:36 pm
Results for threat assessment
13 results foundAuthor: Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) Title: The Police Response to Active Shooter Incidents Summary: "The Police Response to Active Shooter Incidents," which describes changes in police departments' practices in responding to mass shootings, such as the ones that occurred at the Sandy Hook Elementary School and the Washington, DC Navy Yard. Today's policies and practices are focused on reducing the number of victims when an active shooter incident happens. There is an emphasis on engaging the shooter as quickly as possible and not necessarily waiting for SWAT or other special units to arrive. In addition, police, fire, and emergency medical services are conducting joint training designed to get medical assistance to gunshot victims as quickly as possible. Sometimes this involves allowing EMS workers to enter "warm zones" before it is certain that the shooter or shooters have been apprehended. And police officers can be trained to give life-saving medical care. The report also describes efforts by police to work with other governmental and private organizations to prevent active shooter incidents, by identifying persons who may pose a threat and helping them to get treatment for mental illness or other needs. Finally, the report discusses ways in which police can educate community members about what to do if they are confronted with an active shooting situation. Details: Washington, DC: PERF, 2014. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: Critical Issues in Policing Series: Accessed July 1, 2014 at: http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Critical_Issues_Series/the%20police%20response%20to%20active%20shooter%20incidents%202014.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Critical_Issues_Series/the%20police%20response%20to%20active%20shooter%20incidents%202014.pdf Shelf Number: 132585 Keywords: Active Shooter IncidentsCrisis InterventionGun ViolenceMass MurdersMass ShootingsPolice ProceduresPolice TrainingThreat Assessment |
Author: Cornell, Dewey Title: Threat Assessment in Virginia Schools: Technical Report of the Threat Assessment Survey for 2013-2014 Summary: In 2013, Virginia passed legislation (S 22.1-79.4) which required local school boards to establish threat assessment teams for each public school. The Threat Assessment Survey was designed to gather information on the quantity and quality of threat cases in Virginia schools in order to assist them in developing effective school safety practices. Threats are broadly defined as a student's communication or behavior that indicates intent to harm someone. Schools were asked to describe their threat assessment program and report on up to five threat assessment cases. An initial summary of overall results is provided in the 2014 School Safety Audit Report. This report is a technical supplement to the 2014 School Safety Audit Report that is intended to provide information specific to elementary, middle, or high schools, excluding 196 other types of schools such as alternative, pre-kindergarten, and special education schools. Many of the analyses in this report are limited to the 810 schools that had at least one threat assessment case during the 2013-14 school year and focused specifically on cases involving threats to harm others. Readers are cautioned that these results are based on a selected sample and may not generalize to all Virginia schools. This report is concerned with describing the threat assessment process from start to finish, with information on the prevalence of threats across school levels and student populations, description of the kinds of threats, how schools responded to threats, and the outcomes for students and their intended victims. One caveat is that prevalence rates and other results obtained from this survey may change in future years as all school threat assessment teams refine their procedures and become more experienced in conducting threat assessments. Details: Charlottesville, VA: Curry School of Education, University of Virginia, 2015. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 20, 2015 at: http://www.dcjs.virginia.gov/vcscs/documents/TechnicalReport2014ThreatAssessmentSurvey5-12-15.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.dcjs.virginia.gov/vcscs/documents/TechnicalReport2014ThreatAssessmentSurvey5-12-15.pdf Shelf Number: 135736 Keywords: School CrimeSchool SafetySchool SecuritySchool ViolenceThreat Assessment |
Author: Cohen, Katie Title: Who Will Be a Lone Wolf Terrorist? Mechanisms of self-radicalisation and the possibility of detecting lone offender threats on the Internet Summary: Solo actor terrorism, also known as lone wolf terrorism, is a growing threat against civil security, partly due to the fact that Internet access makes it easier than ever to engage in study and dissemination of extremist views. A large variation regarding factors such as ideology, social background, psychopathology and personality type means there is no clear profile for lone wolf terrorists. An assessment of which individuals from a population of political extremists that will go on to commit acts of terrorism can therefore not only be based on factors such as individual experiences or personality traits. A threat assessment should rather be based on the potential perpetrator's behaviour during the time closely preceding the attack. Hence, behaviours that have been empirically proven to precede terrorist attacks and other incidents of planned violence, such as mass murder or school shootings, so called warning behaviours, can have an important role in assessing lone wolf terrorist threats. Warning behaviours often precede terrorist acts and are in their turn preceded by a radicalisation process, where an individual gradually enters a state of mind characterised by a proneness to premeditated violence with the purpose of advancing an ideology. Most lone wolf terrorists have gone through a process of self-radicalisation, wherein media has had a crucial role. Internet is indisputably the medium that has had the greatest influence on the radicalisation process during the last decade. However, while it has facilitated the process, the Internet has also created new possibilities of discovering warning behaviours prior to an actual terrorist attack. From an existing typology of eight different warning behaviours, the three that can most easily be inferred from the subject's Internet communication will be discussed in the following report: (1) Leakage, when the subject, more or less specifically and more or less intentionally, informs a third party about an intent to perpetrate a terrorist attack, (2) fixation, which expresses an extreme preoccupation with a person or cause or extensive gathering of facts about a target, and (3) identification, which comprises a self-image characterised by fantasies about being a hero or warrior and/or a strong interest in weapons and military paraphernalia, as well as a strong influence from other radical proponents of lone wolf terrorism. The aim of the following report is firstly, to shed light on different hypotheses about the psychological mechanisms behind self-radicalisation and the interaction between the individual and the environment during the radicalisation process, and secondly, to examine the possibility of using semi-automatic techniques for text analysis of the subjects Internet communication to discover warning behaviours. Details: Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2012. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 18, 2015 at: http://www.foi.se/en/Search/Abstract/?rNo=FOI-R--3531--SE Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.foi.se/en/Search/Abstract/?rNo=FOI-R--3531--SE Shelf Number: 137887 Keywords: Lone Wolf TerrorismRadicalizationTerrorismTerroristsThreat Assessment |
Author: Jenkins, Brian Michael Title: Do Significant Terrorist Attacks Increase the Risk of Further Attacks? Initial Observations from a Statistical Analysis of Terrorist Attacks in the United States and Europe from 1970 to 2013 Summary: Major terrorist events in the United States and Europe generate fear among the public and prompt swifter responses from public officials, reflecting a belief that terrorist attacks occur in clusters. If there is one attack, the concern is that others will soon follow. That presumption leads to two analytical questions: Does a significant terrorist attack somehow inspire other terrorist attacks, and can terrorist attacks be anticipated statistically? To answer these questions, RAND researchers examine the historical record of terrorism in the United States and Europe between 1970 and the end of 2013. Using the Global Terrorism Database, the researchers find an absence of clustering for terrorist events around trigger events since 1994, no increases in terrorism on significant dates, and a decline of terrorism in the West since the 1970s, suggesting that the threat of terrorism should not affect individuals' behavior and decisions in the United States and Western Europe - not even in the wake of a significant terrorist event. However, heightened security may be justified. It may enable authorities to respond quickly to increased reports of suspicious activity and hoaxes that terrorist events inspire. Increased police presence also permits authorities to diagnose and intervene more rapidly if there are further incidents. Moreover, temporary security increases may be warranted as a precautionary measure, even if only to reassure an alarmed public that it is safe. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Perspectives: Accessed April 20, 2016 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE173/RAND_PE173.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE173/RAND_PE173.pdf Shelf Number: 138706 Keywords: Homeland SecurityTerrorismTerroristsThreat Assessment |
Author: Goodrum, Sarah Title: Report on the Arapahoe High School Shooting: Lessons Learned on Information Sharing, Threat Assessment, and Systems Integrity Summary: To better understand how the December 13, 2013 shooting at Arapahoe High School, in which senior Karl Pierson (hereafter, referred to as KP3 ) shot and killed Claire Davis and then himself, might be prevented, the Arapahoe High School Community Fund Honoring Claire Davis, a donor-advised fund of The Denver Foundation, approached the Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence (CSPV) at the University of Colorado Boulder to assist with the collection, analysis, and interpretation of data obtained from an arbitration proceeding in the case. The purpose was to understand the school's threat and risk assessment procedures and responses, and the lessons that might be learned from this incident that could improve youth violence prevention in school settings in Colorado and the U.S. The data for the report came from the Arapahoe County Sheriff's Office's (ACSO) investigation materials, Littleton Public School's (LPS) interrogatory responses, deposition exhibits, and deposition testimony. The principal investigators attended most of the depositions and reviewed all of the documents produced by ACSO and LPS. The findings revealed three major failures within AHS and LPS in the months and years leading up to the shooting: (1) a failure of information sharing, (2) a failure of threat assessment, and (3) a failure of systems thinking. While not the focus of this report, preliminary evidence indicates that AHS staff and LPS administrators have made several changes in their approach to school safety since 2013, and those changes represent important steps in the right direction To better understand how the December 13, 2013 shooting at Arapahoe High School, in which senior Karl Pierson (hereafter, referred to as KP3 ) shot and killed Claire Davis and then himself, might be prevented, the Arapahoe High School Community Fund Honoring Claire Davis, a donor-advised fund of The Denver Foundation, approached the Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence (CSPV) at the University of Colorado Boulder to assist with the collection, analysis, and interpretation of data obtained from an arbitration proceeding in the case. The purpose was to understand the school's threat and risk assessment procedures and responses, and the lessons that might be learned from this incident that could improve youth violence prevention in school settings in Colorado and the U.S. The data for the report came from the Arapahoe County Sheriff's Office's (ACSO) investigation materials, Littleton Public School's (LPS) interrogatory responses, deposition exhibits, and deposition testimony. The principal investigators attended most of the depositions and reviewed all of the documents produced by ACSO and LPS. The findings revealed three major failures within AHS and LPS in the months and years leading up to the shooting: (1) a failure of information sharing, (2) a failure of threat assessment, and (3) a failure of systems thinking. While not the focus of this report, preliminary evidence indicates that AHS staff and LPS administrators have made several changes in their approach to school safety since 2013, and those changes represent important steps in the right direction leading the school staff to believe that they would be more liable if they had shared information about KP's concerning behaviors, than if they had not. Second, the Sheriff's Report clearly states that at least ten AHS students had substantive concerns about KP's anger problems and gun ownership prior to the shooting, but only one student reported their concern to a counselor and no students reported their concerns to Safe2Tell (see ACSO Report, pp. 10-11). If just one student or teacher, had called Safe2Tell, this tragedy might have been averted. At the time of the shooting and as of July 2015, LPS and AHS administrators did not have a policy regarding Safe2Tell training and did not require that students or staff receive training on the Safe2Tell system. In fact, the information shared about Safe2Tell at AHS was limited to a sticker on the back of student identification cards, posters displayed in the school hallways, and a PowerPoint slide displayed in the cafeteria. Third, AHS and LPS failed to implement an Interagency Information Sharing Agreement to facilitate the sharing of vital information about an individual's safety concerns with law enforcement, juvenile justice, and social services agencies, which is recommended by Colorado statute (SB 00-133), the Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence (CSPV), and the Colorado School Safety Resource Center (see the CSSRC's Essentials of School Threat Assessment: Preventing Targeted School Violence, LPS 03421-03443). Details: Boulder, CO: Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence (CSPV) at the University of Colorado Boulder, 2016. 141p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 6, 2017 at: http://www.colorado.edu/cspv/publications/AHS-Report/Report_on_the_Arapahoe_High_School_Shooting_FINAL.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://www.colorado.edu/cspv/publications/AHS-Report/Report_on_the_Arapahoe_High_School_Shooting_FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 147035 Keywords: Information SharingSchool SafetySchool ShootingsSchool ViolenceThreat AssessmentViolence Prevention |
Author: National Threat Assessment Center Title: investigating Ideologically Inspired Violent Extremists: Local Partners Are An Asset. A Case Study of Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad Summary: The U.S. Secret Service conducts threat assessment investigations on individuals who come to attention for having a threatening or concerning interest in Secret Service protected interests (e.g., the White House, the Inauguration). A routine part of the investigative process is working within local communities to gather additional information that enhances the assessment of the risk these individuals may pose. Federal investigations into ideologically motivated violent extremists, who are at risk for engaging in targeted violence, can also be enhanced by gathering such community-level information from those who have knowledge about these individuals. These efforts involve working with local law enforcement and other public safety partners to learn more about those under investigation, as well as interviewing others who are familiar with these individuals. Using examples from the case of Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad, this document shares some of the information local agencies and individuals had about his behavior prior to the incident. Muhammad opened fire on two uniformed service members outside the Army-Navy Career Center in Little Rock, AR, in June 2009. A case summary of Muhammad's life also follows. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Secret Service, 2015. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 4, 2018 at: https://www.secretservice.gov/data/protection/ntac/Abdulhakim_Muhammad_Using_Local_Assets.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://www.secretservice.gov/data/protection/ntac/Abdulhakim_Muhammad_Using_Local_Assets.pdf Shelf Number: 149672 Keywords: ExtremismHomeland SecuritySecret ServiceThreat AssessmentViolent Extremists |
Author: National Threat Assessment Center Title: Mass Attacks in Public Spaces - 2017 Summary: Between January and December 2017, 28 incidents of mass attacks, during which three or more persons were harmed, were carried out in public places within the United States (see map for locations). These acts violated the safety of the places we work, learn, shop, relax, and otherwise conduct our day-to-day lives. The resulting loss of 147 lives and injury to nearly 700 others had a devastating impact on our nation as a whole. As the uncertainty they caused continues to ripple through our communities, those charged with ensuring public safety strive to identify methods to prevent these types of attacks. To aid in these efforts, the U.S. Secret Service National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC) examined these 28 incidents, to identify key themes for enhancing threat assessment and investigative practices. Regardless of whether these attacks were acts of workplace violence, domestic violence, school-based violence, or terrorism, similar themes were observed in the backgrounds of the perpetrators, including: Nearly half were motivated by a personal grievance related to a workplace, domestic, or other issue. Over half had histories of criminal charges, mental health symptoms, and/or illicit substance use or abuse. All had at least one significant stressor within the last five years, and over half had indications of financial instability in that timeframe. Over three-quarters made concerning communications and/or elicited concern from others prior to carrying out their attacks. On average, those who did elicit concern caused more harm than those who did not. These findings, and others in this report, support existing best practices that the U.S. Secret Service has established in the field of threat assessment. They highlight the importance of gathering information on a person's background, behaviors, and situational factors; corroborating the information from multiple sources; assessing the risk the individual poses for violence; and identifying intervention points to mitigate that risk. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Secret Service, 2017. 7p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 4, 2018 at: https://www.secretservice.gov/data/protection/ntac/USSS_NTAC-Mass_Attacks_in_Public_Spaces-2017.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://www.secretservice.gov/data/protection/ntac/USSS_NTAC-Mass_Attacks_in_Public_Spaces-2017.pdf Shelf Number: 149673 Keywords: Gun ViolenceGun-Related ViolenceMass ShootingsPublic SpacesSecret ServiceThreat AssessmentViolence |
Author: U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation Title: Active Shooter Incidents in the United States in 2016 and 2017 Summary: The FBI has designated 50 shootings in 2016 and 2017 as active shooter incidents. Twenty incidents occurred in 2016, while 30 incidents occurred in 2017. As with past FBI active shooter-related publications, this report does not encompass all gun-related situations. Rather, it focuses on a specific type of shooting situation. The FBI defines an active shooter as one or more individuals actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a populated area. Implicit in this definition is the shooter's use of one or more firearms. The active aspect of the definition inherently implies that both law enforcement personnel and citizens have the potential to affect the outcome of the event based upon their responses to the situation. This report supplements two previous publications: A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States Between 2000 and 20132 and Active Shooter Incidents in the United States in 2014 and 2015.3 The methodology articulated in the 2000-2013 study was applied to the 2016 and 2017 incidents to ensure consistency. Excluded from this report are gang- and drug-related shootings and gun-related incidents that appeared not to have put other people in peril (e.g., the accidental discharge of a firearm in a bar). Analysts relied on official law enforcement investigative reports (when available), FBI holdings, and publicly available resources when gathering data for this report. Though limited in scope, this report was undertaken to provide clarity and data of value to federal, state, tribal, and campus law enforcement as well as other first responders, corporations, educators, and the general public as they seek to neutralize threats posed by active shooters and save lives during such incidents. Details: Washington, DC: FBI, 2018. 18p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 7, 2018 at: https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/active-shooter-incidents-us-2016-2017.pdf/view Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/active-shooter-incidents-us-2016-2017.pdf/view Shelf Number: 150072 Keywords: Active Shooter IncidentsGun Violence Gun-Related Violence (U.S.) Homicides Mass HomicidesSchool Violence Threat AssessmentViolent Crime Workplace Violence |
Author: Silver, James Title: A Study of the Pre-Attack Behaviors of Active Shooters in the United States Between 2000 and 2013 Summary: In 2017 there were 30 separate active shootings in the United States, the largest number ever recorded by the FBI during a one-year period. With so many attacks occurring, it can become easy to believe that nothing can stop an active shooter determined to commit violence. "The offender just snapped" and "There's no way that anyone could have seen this coming" are common reactions that can fuel a collective sense of a "new normal," one punctuated by a sense of hopelessness and helplessness. Faced with so many tragedies, society routinely wrestles with a fundamental question: can anything be done to prevent attacks on our loved ones, our children, our schools, our churches, concerts, and communities? There is cause for hope because there is something that can be done. In the weeks and months before an attack, many active shooters engage in behaviors that may signal impending violence. While some of these behaviors are intentionally concealed, others are observable and - if recognized and reported - may lead to a disruption prior to an attack. Unfortunately, well-meaning bystanders (often friends and family members of the active shooter) may struggle to appropriately categorize the observed behavior as malevolent. They may even resist taking action to report for fear of erroneously labeling a friend or family member as a potential killer. Once reported to law enforcement, those in authority may also struggle to decide how best to assess and intervene, particularly if no crime has yet been committed. By articulating the concrete, observable pre-attack behaviors of many active shooters, the FBI hopes to make these warning signs more visible and easily identifiable. This information is intended to be used not only by law enforcement officials, mental health care practitioners, and threat assessment professionals, but also by parents, friends, teachers, employers and anyone who suspects that a person is moving towards violence. In 2014, the FBI published a report titled A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States Between 2000 and 2013. One hundred and sixty active shooter incidents in the United States occurring between 2000 and 2013 were included in the sample. In this first report, the FBI focused on the circumstances of the active shooting events (e.g., location, duration, and resolution) but did not attempt to identify the motive driving the offender, nor did it highlight observable pre-attack behaviors demonstrated by the offender. The 2014 report will be referred to as the "Phase I" study. The present study ("Phase II") is the natural second phase of that initiative, moving from an examination of the parameters of the shooting events to assessing the pre-attack behaviors of the shooters themselves. This second phase, then, turns from the vitally important inquiry of "what happened during and after the shooting" to the pressing questions of "how do the active shooters behave before the attack?" and, if it can be determined, "why did they attack?" The FBI's objective here was to examine specific behaviors that may precede an attack and which might be useful in identifying, assessing, and managing those who may be on a pathway to deadly violence. Details: Washington, DC; U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2018. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 21, 2018 at: https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/pre-attack-behaviors-of-active-shooters-in-us-2000-2013.pdf/view Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/pre-attack-behaviors-of-active-shooters-in-us-2000-2013.pdf/view Shelf Number: 150624 Keywords: Active ShootersGun ViolenceGun-Related ViolenceGunsHomicidesMass ShootingsThreat AssessmentViolent OffendersWeapons |
Author: Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission Title: Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission Initial Report Summary: Commission Responsibilities and Scope of Report The MSDHSPSA specified a number of specific considerations and topics that the Commission should address in its initial report to the Governor, Speaker of the House and Senate President. The following is a summary of the tasks as assigned by law. - Produce a timeline of the incident, incident response and all relevant events preceding the incident. - Review interactions between the perpetrator and governmental entities such as schools, law enforcement agencies, courts and social service agencies. - Identify failures to adequately communicate or coordinate regarding indicators of risk or possible threats and whether failures contributed to an inability to prevent deaths and injuries - Analyze incident response by local law enforcement agencies and school resource officers, including a review of existing policies and procedures for active assailant incidents at Marjory Stoneman Douglas. - Evaluate whether the incident response complied with the existing policies and procedures and how those existing policies and procedures compare to national best practices. -Evaluate whether failures in the policies and procedures, or execution of them, contributed to an inability to prevent deaths and injuries. - Provide recommendations for improvements for law enforcement and school resource officer response. - Provide recommendation for a ratio of school resource officers per school by school type along with a methodology for determining ratio, which must include school location, student population and school design. - Provide recommendations for improving communication and coordination of agencies that have knowledge of indicators of risk or possible threats of mass violence. - Provide recommendations for effectively using available state/local tools and resources for enhancing communication and coordination related to indicators of risk or possible threats. During the Commission's first meeting on April 24, 2018, the requirements of the law were discussed and grouped into specific topic areas. The Commission voted on a list of topic areas to be included in the initial report. They are as follows: - History of K-12 active assailant events - Nikolas Cruz background and timeline - Marjory Stoneman Douglas physical structure and security - Active assailant response- Broward schools and school board - Active assailant response Broward sheriff's office on campus response - Active assailant response- law enforcement officer response by Broward Sheriff's Office, Coral Springs Police Department and incident command response. - Other topics: social media, Florida mental health system, baker act, privacy laws and threat assessment and management. During the course of the Commission's investigation and subsequent Commission meetings, other topics were addressed and these topic areas were slightly modified and reorganized as presented in this report. Because of the urgency of this issue, the Commission's initial report was completed within a relatively short time-frame in relation to the shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas. In many other similar incidents, such as Columbine High School and Sandy Hook Elementary shootings, post incident reports and evaluations were completed several years following the events. As a result, several ancillary investigations into the Marjory Stoneman Douglas massacre or parts of the incident were also in the process of being conducted at the same time the Commission was conducting its investigation. This Commission attempted to coordinate with the entities conducting the other investigations so as not to duplicate or interfere with the other investigations, but some of the final reports were not available to the Commission for the purposes of compiling this report. There were also several active legal cases regarding the incident, which impeded obtaining some relevant testimony, documents and other investigative materials. During the Commission's subsequent years, portions of this report may be amended to take into account new information not available at the time this report was prepared. Details: Florida: Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission, 2018. 407p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 18, 2018 at: http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/MSDHS/Meetings/2018/December-Meeting-Documents/Marjory-Stoneman-Douglas-High-School-Public-Draft1.aspx Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://www.campussafetymagazine.com/safety/stoneman-douglas-safety-commission-findings/?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=content&eid=350368269&bid=2329105 Shelf Number: 154071 Keywords: Active ShooterGun ViolenceLaw Enforcement ResponseMarjory Stoneman High School MassacreMass ShootingsMass ViolenceMental HealthSchool Resource OfficersSchool SafetySchool ShootingsThreat Assessment |
Author: U.S. Federal Commission on School Safety Title: Final Report of the Federal Commission on School Safety Summary: The efforts of the Federal Commission on School Safety have been guided by the need to promote state and local solutions to school violence. To that end, the Commission conducted field visits, listening sessions, and meetings with hundreds of Americans all across the country. The input of these individuals-state and local policymakers, administrators, principals and teachers, law enforcement and healthcare professionals, students and their families-was critical in identifying best practices and the recommendations contained in this Report. As set forth in the pages that follow, the work of the Commission falls into three broad categories: a) Prevent-preventing school violence; b Protect and Mitigate-protecting students and teachers and mitigating the effects of violence; and c) Respond and Recover-responding to and recovering from attacks. Details: Washington, DC: The Commission, 2018. 180p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 23, 2019 at: https://www2.ed.gov/documents/school-safety/school-safety-report.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://www2.ed.gov/documents/school-safety/school-safety-report.pdf Shelf Number: 154383 Keywords: School Bullying School Crime School Safety School Violence Threat Assessment |
Author: Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission Title: Initial Report Summary: School safety in Florida needs to be improved. We can do more and we can do a better job of ensuring the safety of students and staff on K-12 school campuses. Not all school security changes or enhancements have financial costs, and some only require the will of decision-makers to effect change and hold people responsible for implementing best practices. Safety and security accountability is lacking in schools, and that accountability is paramount for effective change if we expect a different result in the future than what occurred at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School (MSDHS) on February 14, 2018. Accountability starts at the top of every organization, and all leaders have an obligation to ensure not only that the law is followed, but that effective policies and best practices are implemented. Even after the MSDHS shooting and the implementation of new Florida law requiring certain safety measures, there remains non-compliance and a lack of urgency to enact basic safety principles in Florida's K-12 schools. All stakeholders-school districts, law enforcement, mental health providers, city and county governments, funding entities, etc. - should embrace the opportunity to change and make Florida schools the safest in the nation. There must be a sense of urgency-and there is not, across-the-board-in enhancing school safety. At its core, basic, effective school safety begins with prevention. Prevention strategies not only focus on target hardening, but include early intervention when youth demonstrate indicators that should be immediately and appropriately assessed and addressed. However, equally important are harm mitigation aspects of school safety, which can be divided into a few key components: identifying the threat at the earliest possible moment; notifying others of the threat; implementing an effective response by those vulnerable to the threat; and stopping the threat as soon as possible. These harm mitigation concepts should be immediately implemented across all Florida K-12 schools. There are more complex, proactive components to school safety that will help prevent violence from occurring, but once an attack has commenced, the focus must be on immediately mitigating the harm, and these basic concepts, as set forth in this report's recommendations, are essential to that goal. Details: Tallahassee: Florida Department of Law Enforcement, 2019. 458p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 15, 2019 at: http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/MSDHS/CommissionReport.pdf Year: 2019 Country: United States URL: http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/MSDHS/CommissionReport.pdf Shelf Number: 154628 Keywords: Gun ViolenceMass ShootingsMass ViolenceSchool SafetySchool SecuritySchool ShootingsSchool ViolenceThreat Assessment |
Author: Europol Title: Intellectual Property Crime Threat Assessment 2019 Summary: This threat assessment is drawn up in partnership between Europol and the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) and is intended to update policymakers, law enforcement authorities and the public in general about the latest trends and the current impact of intellectual property crime within the EU. The report focuses on the counterfeiting and piracy affecting the EU and provides an assessment of the threat posed by this counterfeiting and piracy in several product sectors, as well as cross-cutting factors that influence or impact the criminal area. It builds upon two previously developed joint situation reports, published in 2015 and 2017. Counterfeit and pirated goods could make up as much as 6.8% of EU imports, amounting to EUR 121 billion. In recent years, this amount has significantly increased. The annual number of detentions of counterfeit goods by customs authorities in the EU has gradually decreased since 2013, even if the number of items seized and their estimated value has decreased at a lower pace, with a temporary recuperation in 2015 and 2016. This slightly decreasing trend hides a sustained increase in the effectiveness of the operations, as shown by the number of items seized and their value per case or per procedure. Most counterfeit items still come from China, although for some specific categories of products other countries are also significant. Counterfeiters often use complex trade routes to transport their goods from the production country to the destination markets. Although shipment of counterfeit goods to the EU still occurs largely in bulk by freight transport, in recent years there has been a strong increase in express transport. This sharp growth in trade via small parcels is related to the growth in online marketplaces selling counterfeit goods. New land routes that have opened in recent years, in particular the growing number of rail connections between China and the EU, may provide counterfeiters with the possibility of diversifying their routes and transportation methods. The advent of better technology has had a profound impact on the nature and extent of counterfeiting. Counterfeiters exploit existing and emerging platforms that have made it easier to advertise, sell and distribute counterfeit and pirated goods to a growing number of consumers. This increase in sales of counterfeit goods via online marketplaces is not new, but rather a continuing trend. In recent years, social media marketplaces especially have emerged as a key platform from which counterfeiters can access high numbers of consumers with a generally low risk of law enforcement detection. Trade in counterfeit and pirated goods on the darknet remains a relatively limited phenomenon. Intellectual property crimes have considerable economic consequences, depriving legitimate businesses of revenue and governments of tax revenue. Besides economic harm, counterfeit goods can have a serious impact on the health and safety of consumers, as well as negative environmental consequences. In recent years, counterfeiting has affected an increasingly diverse number of goods. Besides the traditional luxury items, a wide range of everyday goods are targeted by counterfeiters. This includes cosmetics, electronic components, food and drinks, pesticides, pharmaceuticals, tobacco products, toys and vehicle parts. Electronics are an increasingly counterfeited category of goods. Common examples of this are mobile phones and parts, especially chargers and computer equipment. These are often sold online and shipped directly from several Asian countries to consumers in the EU. In recent years there have also been a high number of detections of counterfeit semiconductors. As these goods are commonly used in the transport sector, but also in hospitals as part of surgical instruments, they pose considerable dangers to health and safety. Food and drinks remain highly popular items for counterfeiters, with the EU consistently emerging as a major destination market for counterfeit food and drinks. Detected counterfeit food products include baby milk powder, stock cubes, cheese, coffee, olive oil and pasta. Several of these goods have been found in groceries and supermarkets, illustrating that they also infiltrate the legal supply chain. As the counterfeit goods are almost always of substandard quality and produced in unhygienic environments, they can pose a serious risk to the health and wellbeing of consumers. In some cases, counterfeit food has even been found to contain dangerous or hazardous ingredients. Law enforcement authorities regularly detect other types of counterfeit goods alongside counterfeit food and drinks, highlighting how organised crime groups are frequently involved in trading an ever wider range of different counterfeit goods. In general, there appears to be an overall professionalisation of the organised crime groups involved in food counterfeiting. Besides food, counterfeit alcoholic beverages pose a considerable risk to EU consumers. Spirits and wine are especially popular goods targeted for counterfeiting by organised crime groups. They frequently place cheap wine in bottles containing fake expensive wine labels, sometimes even adding pure alcohol on counterfeit spirits. Production methods have become increasingly sophisticated in recent years, with some organised crime groups operating their own production lines, including the packaging and labelling of the product. Another method is to use legitimate production lines one day a week or month for the production of counterfeits. Luxury products, clothes and accessories are traditionally among the most popular product categories for (and are still among the most commonly detected) counterfeit goods. This is primarily the result of a large number of small orders via the internet, which are subsequently shipped via postal or courier services. At the same time, there appears to be an increase in production of counterfeit clothes within the EU, with organised crime groups attaching counterfeit labels onto imported, unbranded clothing. In this way, they reduce the risk of detection during the shipping of the clothes. As pesticides are one of the most regulated products in the world today, it is not surprising that a wide range of counterfeits are traded in the EU. A strong increase in seizures in recent years is indicative of the growth of the problem, and of the industry's and the competent authorities' awareness. These goods have not usually been tested and authorised by the authorities, and may contain less active or more toxic ingredients. They can destroy crops and fields and seriously affect the health of farmers and consumers. Organised crime groups involved in counterfeiting pesticides sell their product by placing false brand labels on the product or by using labels in non-EU languages, frequently abusing the parallel trade system. In a growing number of cases, they import only the component ingredients and subsequently produce the counterfeit pesticides within the EU. Counterfeit pharmaceuticals pose a growing threat to the EU, affecting a large number of Member States. A wide and increasingly diverse range of medicines is targeted by counterfeiters. Erectile dysfunction medicines are traditionally among the most common type of counterfeited medicines, but increasingly counterfeited performance enhancing drugs, such as anabolic steroids and doping substances are also detected. Obviously, these pharmaceuticals can have serious effects on the health of consumers. The increased detection of counterfeit medicines for the treatment of serious illnesses, and the growing number of incidents affecting the legal supply chain, are particularly worrisome trends. Organised crime groups might produce counterfeit pharmaceuticals in clandestine laboratories, import counterfeit medicines or sell illegally diverted medicines using falsified branding and packaging. In terms of production, medicines and packaging can be produced in one place, at separate sites, or even by separate organised crime groups. Some of the organised crime groups involved in producing counterfeit pharmaceuticals also produce different types of synthetic drugs. Counterfeiters are growing in sophistication, employing highly skilled workers and setting up their own production lines. A growing number of counterfeit pharmaceuticals are detected in small parcels, facilitated by a continuous expansion of unauthorised and unregulated online pharmacies. The growth of the internet has given counterfeiters unique opportunities to get involved in piracy, selling and distributing unauthorised books, games, movies and music. This illegal digital content is distributed via BitTorrent portals and peer-to-peer networks, but increasingly also via cyberlockers. The owners of these platforms generate profit through digital advertisements, which often include mainstream adverts from major brands. In many cases, these websites are also used to target consumers with phishing attempts or for disseminating malware. In recent years, there has also been an increasing number of detections of the illegal use of Internet Protocol Television (IPTV) technology. In many of these cases, the servers are located in different countries to those where the subscriptions are sold, making it particularly complicated for law enforcement authorities to detect the criminals behind them. The number of counterfeit tobacco products detected, mostly cigarettes, has been decreasing for 4 years in a row. Nonetheless, in 2017, cigarettes were still third place in the list of most commonly detected counterfeit goods. Whereas detections of imported counterfeit cigarettes showed a decrease, over the last few years, the production of counterfeit cigarettes in the EU has seen a considerable increase. These illicit factories are becoming increasingly sophisticated and modern, capable of producing up to 2 million cigarettes a day. Intense law enforcement activity in eastern European countries seems to have diversified the locations of illicit tobacco production sites in the EU. Although most of the counterfeit cigarettes are still sold on the street, there has been an increase in online trade and shipment via small parcels. Finally, in recent years, the number of counterfeit vehicle parts detected has considerably increased. Counterfeiters produce a wide range of different car parts, including brake pads, airbags and filters. The increase in counterfeit car parts is driven by the growth in the online trade of these products. Most of these goods do not comply with recognised safety standards, which can result in potentially fatal failures of the vehicles. Besides car parts, counterfeited high-end road bikes and bicycle parts, such as helmets, have also been detected. The market for counterfeit goods remains highly profitable, providing criminals with opportunities to generate huge profits while running few risks. Most criminal activity involving counterfeiting is undoubtedly performed by organised crime groups and there appears to be an overall professionalisation of these groups. An increasingly wide array of different counterfeit and pirated goods are available on the EU market, ranging from luxury goods to mundane, everyday items. Besides economic damage, many of these items can pose a serious threat to the environment and the health and safety of consumers, thus providing a clear demonstration of the need for strong efforts to tackle this criminal activity. Details: The Hague, Netherlands: Europol and European Union Intellectual Property Office, 2019. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 18, 2019 at: https://euipo.europa.eu/tunnel-web/secure/webdav/guest/document_library/observatory/documents/reports/2019_IP_Crime_Threat_Assessment_Report/2019_IP_Crime_Threat_Assessment_Report.pdf Year: 2019 Country: Europe URL: https://euipo.europa.eu/tunnel-web/secure/webdav/guest/document_library/observatory/documents/reports/2019_IP_Crime_Threat_Assessment_Report/2019_IP_Crime_Threat_Assessment_Report.pdf Shelf Number: 156488 Keywords: Counterfeit Drugs Counterfeit Foods Counterfeit Goods Counterfeit Luxury Products Counterfeit Medicine Counterfeit Pesticides Counterfeit Tobacco Counterfeiters Darknet Intellectual Property Crime Law Enforcement Organized Crime Groups Pirated Goods Supply Chain Security Threat Assessment |